Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to investigate fixed point arithmetic in ring-based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes. We provide three main contributions: Firstly, we investigate the representation of fixed point numbers. We analyse the two representations from Dowlin et al, representing a fixed point number as a large integer (encoded as a scaled polynomial) versus a polynomial-based fractional representation. We show that these two are, in fact, isomorphic by presenting an explicit isomorphism between the two that enables us to map the parameters from one representation to another. Secondly, given a computation and a bound on the fixed point numbers used as inputs and scalars within the computation, we achieve a way of producing lower bounds on the plaintext modulus p and the degree of the ring d needed to support complex homomorphic operations. Finally, we investigate an application in homomorphic image processing. We have an image given in encrypted form and are required to perform the standard image processing pipeline of Fourier Transform-Hadamard Product-Inverse Fourier Transform. In particular we examine applications in which the specific matrices involved in the Hadamard multiplication are also encrypted. We propose a mixed Fourier Transform Algorithm which aims to strike a compromise between the number of homomorphic multiplications and the parameter sizes of the underlying SHE scheme.
Introduction
The efficiency of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) schemes has improved dramatically in the seven years since their discovery by Gentry in 2009 [7] . The main effort in research now is to obtain practical schemes for a given class of interesting functions; since practical Fully Homomorphic Encryption seems out of reach using existing techniques.
When proposing to use SHE schemes in an application a key issue is how to map the data types of the application to the supported data types of the SHE scheme. Most theoretical treatments consider SHE schemes which work over bits, and the application is assumed to be the evaluation of some binary circuit. In practice this is likely to be very costly, and so some authors have considered other scenarios in which the computations are performed over arithmetic circuits or polynomial rings [6, 8, 10] .
At their heart almost all SHE schemes make use of a plaintext space R p , which is the reduction modulo p of a polynomial ring over the integers R. We shall refer to p as the plaintext modulus, which is often selected to be a prime. The ring is frequently selected to be the ring of integers of a cyclotomic number field; i.e. R = Z[X]/Φ m (X).
In considering an application one has a number of factors to balance; first the SHE multiplicative depth of the functions which can be evaluated; secondly the plaintext modulus p and thirdly the security level required. These all imply bounds on the degree of the ring one is using; and hence the efficiency of the application 3 .
Of importance in what follows is that a SHE scheme has a maximum multiplicative depth bounding what can be evaluated. In practice this consists of a number of levels, where each ciphertext is associated to a specific level. Multiplication of ciphertexts at levels i 0 and i 1 results in a ciphertext at level max(i 0 , i 1 ) + 1; whereas scalar multiplication is equivalent to the addition of roughly half a level. Once the maximum level is obtained, no further homomorphic operations are possible.
The first obvious method to move away from binary circuits is to consider plaintext moduli other than p = 2, and hence to evaluate arithmetic circuits. Indeed the first application of SHE schemes to obtain an efficiency improvement upon other technologies did precisely this; for example the use of large plaintext moduli p in the SPDZ protocol [5] . However, using arithmetic circuits is also limited. For example, suppose one wished to perform integer arithmetic. In that case, naively increasing p to a large enough value to cope with the largest integer the application could obtain would impose considerable performance penalties.
One can think of using a large plaintext modulus p as using a plaintext space which is long and thin. Some authors have tried to balance the choice of p and the degree d of the ring R to obtain more efficient representation of integers, akin to a more short and fat plaintext space [10] . A problem overlooked by many authors is to how to select p and d to enable such a plaintext representation of integer valued payloads; and in particular to bound p and d as a complex homomorphic operation is performed. This is the first problem we consider in this paper. Given a computation on integers, and a bound on the input integers, we are able to produce lower bounds on p and d needed to support such a homomorphic calculation. Our main general technical contribution is to derive such lower bounds on p and d.
Given an ability to process plaintext messages consisting of large integers the next task is to process fixed-point numbers. A number of authors have considered methodologies for this, most notably Dowlin et al [6] . Dowlin et al present two efficient methods to represent fixed-point numbers. In the first they encode a fixed point number as a scaled integer (which they then encode as a polynomial), whilst in the second they utilize a fractional representation (also based on polynomials). The advantage of the former method is that it is easier to analyse and it can be applied for any polynomial plaintext ring R p . However, it also requires complex bookkeeping of the homomorphic ciphertexts during a calculation to ensure that the fixed-point numbers are correctly scaled. The fractional representation avoids such bookkeeping, but it appears harder to analyse so as to derive parameters which will support the homomorphic operations. Further, it requires R to be selected to be a cyclotomic ring Z[X]/Φ m (X), where m is a power of two. We show show that the two representations are in fact isomorphic, when used with the same power of two cyclotomic ring; we present a concrete isomorphism between the two underlying rings and hence are able to map our parameters from the first representation to the second.
Our third contribution is to analyse a relatively complex but useful fixedpoint algorithm namely the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). This is needed to perform applications such as homomorphic image processing. When examining our fixed point algorithms for addition and multiplication it will be immediately seen that one needs to consider the homomorphic levels which a given calculation will consume. Additionally, one must also consider how much the fixed point calculation increases the demands on the plaintext space, with repeated scalar multiplication being particularly costly. This is particularly interesting for the FFT algorithm, since at its heart the FFT algorithm is a linear operation performed in a recursive manner (with an FFT of size n reduced to two FFTs of size n/2). This recursion decreases the number of scalar multiplications needed, but increases the depth of the scalar multiplications needed. The naive Fourier Transform is also a linear operation, but it consists of only scalar multiplications of depth one. Thus one has a trade off between reducing the number of operations against the required depth.
Previous authors have examined homomorphic evaluation of the Fourier transform [2, 3] . Indeed by exploiting the linear nature of the calculation they utilized an encoding of fixed point numbers via scaled integers. Then they used the additively homomorphic Paillier encryption algorithm to perform the homomorphic evaluation of the Fourier transform. This has a number of disadvantages. Firstly by encoding in a purely integer manner the Paillier plaintext modulus space N increases dramatically if one is to perform an FFT, followed by a linear map, followed by an inverse FFT. In addition it requires all homomorphic operations in an application to be linear.
We consider a standard image processing pipeline of FFT, followed by application of some operation in the Fourier domain, followed by an inverse FFT. The use of additively homomorphic encryption would imply that the operation in the Fourier domain would also need to be linear. Even the simplest form of such processing (Hadamard multiplication by a given matrix) would require that the matrix be public and not also encrypted.
Thus in the third part of this paper we consider the homomorphic evaluation of such an image processing pipeline using Hadamard multiplication by an encrypted matrix as our main processing step. We examine the resulting homomorphic algorithms, given bounds on the plaintext spaces derived from our earlier analysis, and present runtimes obtained from an implementation using the using the HELib library [9] . Whilst we are not able to process large images in the encrypted domain, one notes that processing of tiny (32 × 32 pixel) images have found application in some domains, e.g. [13] . In addition even when processing large images, they are often divided into smaller patches during the processing pipeline.
Integer Arithmetic
We first consider the simpler case of integer arithmetic; it will turn out that once this is solved fixed point arithmetic can be built on top of the integer arithmetic. We wish to process an arithmetic circuit over the integers where the input encrypted integers, and scalars, come from multiple ranges [−L i , . . . , L i ]. Allowing different ranges for different inputs and scalars will result more accurate bounds when we come to consider the FFT algorithm later. Clearly as the circuit is computed the bound on the size of the integers increases, and it is this growth in size which we need to deal with if we are to be able to cope with integers encrypted via our SHE scheme.
As a warm up we consider the simpler case where we we wish to compute a "regular" integer circuit which consists of at most A ≥ 0 additions at each "level" in the circuit, and then, at each level, a layer of multiplications are performed. The multiplicative depth of the circuit will be denoted by M ≥ 1. In addition to simplify this initial discussion we assume all scalars and inputs are in the same range, i.e. we fix L i = L for all i. Clearly the output values from such a circuit will have absolute value bounded by
As explained in the introduction, natively the SHE scheme will encrypt polynomials modulo p, with degree bounded by d. The obvious natural encoding for integers is the scalar encoding method. In this encoding method an integer is encoded as the constant polynomial, then integer addition and multiplication become addition and multiplication modulo p. To ensure correctness we then require than p > 2 · L A,M max , and hence p has to be very large indeed. This would make the SHE scheme highly inefficient, even for very low depth circuits.
Representing Integers As Polynomials
This led some authors, e.g. [10] , to introduce the following method of encoding an integer, which we call the non-balanced base-B encoding method. We encode integers as an integer polynomial in base B, for some base value B to be determined. The polynomial will have negative coefficients for negative integers, and positive coefficients for positive integers. Thus we encode the integer as a polynomial with coefficients in the range [−(B − 1), . . . , (B − 1)]. In particular this implies an integer in the range [−L i , . . . , L i ] on input is encoded as a polynomial of degree at most d
We are interested in how the infinity norm, and degree, of the polynomials increases as we pass through the circuit. Where for a polynomial
Thus for this input/scalar integer at circuit level 0 the infinity norm of our polynomials is bounded by B non−Bal i,0 = B − 1. Another method, considered in [6] , is the balanced base-B encoding. The integer is now encoded as a polynomial with coefficients in the range [−(B − 1)/2, . . . , (B − 1)/2] for an odd integer B ≥ 3. Any polynomial can now have both non-negative and negative coefficients. This method overcomes a limitation of the previous method that wasted part of the plaintext space by allowing only polynomials with coefficients of the same sign. At level 0, our integer is encoded as a polynomial of degree at most
the infinity norm of our input polynomials is bounded by B Bal i,0 = (B − 1)/2. In a later section we outline how to obtain bounds on the degree and infinity norm of the polynomials as we perform a calculation via an integer circuit. It will turn out that the optimal choice in the above two polynomial representations is to use the balanced base B = 3 representation, so in particular we select B Bal i,0 = 1 for the rest of this paper.
Fixed Point Arithmetic
We present two encoding methods for fixed point arithmetic, introduced in [6] . We then show that these two representations are isomorphic. To illustrate the techniques, we will use the two fixed numbers below throughout 
Balanced Base-B Encoding
Our first method represents a fixed point number as two integers, one representing the number and the one representing by which power of B one needs to decode. Thus this method requires a level of book keeping in order to keep track of the second integer. Let y be a real fixed-point number, and denote by y = y + .y − its integer and fractional parts in balanced base-B representation. We then let I + be one less than the number of integer digits and I − be equal to the number of fractional digits; thus we can write
where
Thus we can express y as
We then represent y as the pair of integers (y · B I − , I − ) = (ŷ, i). The integer y can then be represented by a polynomial q(X), by replacing B in the above expression by X, to obtain the final representation (q, i). Thus we have
The degree of the polynomial q(X) above is deg(q) = I − + I + , and to recover the fixed point number y from a pair (q, i) we compute
For our two example fixed point numbers above we have y ≡ (q, i) and y ≡ (q , i ) where i = 3 and i = 1 and
Given this encoding we can now define how to perform basic arithmetic on the encoding.
Addition: Suppose we have two pairs (q, i) and (q , i ) encoding the fixed point numbers, y and y respectively. Write them as above, namely q(X) = q 0 (X) · X i + q 1 (X) and similarly for q (X). Now if i = i , this means that the encodings are not at the same "fixed-point level"
4 and thus the numbers they represent are expressed with a different number of significant digits. Thus, before adding two encodings we must ensure that they are at the same level, by multiplying one by a suitable power of X. Thus if we let I = max(i, i ), we have that (q, i) + (q , i ) = (Q, I), where
To see this indeed corresponds to fixed point multiplication, notice that, assum-
For our two example numbers we have, i = 3 > i = 1, that
and I = max(3, 1) = 3. To check correctness, notice that Q(B) · B −3 = B 2 + B − 3 = 9 + 1/27 = 9.037037 as required.
Multiplication: Multiplication is more straightforward, we simply perform
with correctness being obvious. For our two example fixed point numbers we have the product representation being given by The ring R 1 : We now define a ring R 1 out of the above operations. For reasons which will become apparent later we define the ring as pairs (q, i) where q ∈ Z[X]/Φ m (X) and i ∈ Z/φ(m)Z. In practice we will take m to be a power of two. We define addition and multiplication as above, but now take the resulting pair modulo Φ m (X) and φ(m). The proof of the following theorem is given in Section A.1 of the Supplementary Material. Theorem 1. With the above definitions R 1 is a ring.
This representation of fixed point numbers in the ring R 1 enables us to bound the degree of the polynomial and the coefficients, after a number of homomorphic operations relatively easy, using the techniques in the next section. Of course it also implies that if we perform too many operations the degree of q will become too large and the polynomial will wrap around modulo Φ m (X). Thus the complexity of the operations one performs not only provides a lower bound on p, i.e. an upper bound on the polynomial coefficients, but also a lower bound on the ring degree. These bounds enable us to set parameters for the SHE scheme relatively easy. However, in performing homomorphic operations we not only need for each pair (q, i) to keep a homomorphic encryption of the plaintext q, we also need to keep track (albeit in the clear) the value i.
Fractional Encoding
Our second representation of fixed point numbers dispenses with the need to keep the second component i of our first representation. On the other hand it requires us work in the cyclotomic ring R = Z[X]/(X n + 1), where n is a power of two. Again we let y = y + .y − denote the fixed point number as above, written in balanced base-B representation with I + + 1 digits in y + and I − digits in y − . We again write
. We then encode the fixed point number y in the ring R by the polynomial
where − is the number of digits in the fractional part y − . Given a polynomial q(X) of this form we recover the fixed point number it represents. We will need to know an upper bound for our calculation on p 0 (X), which can be easily calculated from the formulae below. We then take p(X) and split it into p 0 and p 1 as above (using the upper bound on the degree of p(X)), and we recover y by setting
where we utilize the ring equation X n + 1 = 0. For our two example numbers y = 6.370370 . . . and y = 2.666666 . . . we have y ≡ p and y ≡ p where
Notice that we have in both cases that in terms of our prior representation of (q = q 0 · X i + q 1 , i) that p 0 = q 0 and p 1 = q 1 .
Our second ring R 2 is the representation above, i.e. the set of polynomials modulo X n + 1, which is trivially a ring. We now show that addition and multiplication in this ring corresponds to addition and multiplication of the encoded fixed point values.
Addition: Let p(X) = p 0 (X) + p 1 (X) · X n−d1 and p (X) = p 0 (X) + p 1 (X) · X n−d 1 be two elements such as described above, encoding y and y , respectively. To perform the addition we simply add the associated polynomials as follows, without loss of generality, assume that
where P 0 has degree max(d 0 , d 0 ) and P 1 has degree max(d 1 , d 1 ). The polynomial P 1 will in fact be P 1 = p 1 + p 1 · X d1−d 1 . For our two example numbers, their addition therefore has the encoding
which agrees with the numerical value of their sum.
n−d 1 be as above. We write
Then the product y · y is encoded by the product of the two polynomials modulo X n + 1,
For our two example numbers, we have
To check this gives the correct value we note that P 0 (3) − P 1 (3) · 3 −4 = 1376 81 .
Relating R 1 to R 2
On one hand the ring representation of fixed point numbers in the ring R 1 allows us to bound the resulting degree and infinity norm of the associated polynomials encoding the fixed point numbers relatively easily (see the next section). In addition it allows a wide choice of underlying rings, which could enable SIMD computation of specific fixed point operations. However, it requires the "bookkeeping" of base power which is needed to map the encoded integer into a fixed point number.
The ring R 2 on the other hand requires no such bookkeeping, although limited book keeping is needed to ensure decoding after decryption works correctly. In addition it requires that we work in the ring defined by polynomial arithmetic modulo X n + 1, where n is a power of two. A major drawback seems to be that one cannot derive obvious bounds on the degree and coefficients in the fractional representation, something which is crucial in order to set parameters of the SHE scheme. However, such bounds can be derived for the fractional representation, since this representation is isomorphic to the representation using the ring R 1 .
Let φ be as follows,
The proof of this theorem is given in Section A.1 of the Supplementary Material.
Bounds on Integer Arithmetic
Considering the balanced base B method for encoding integers as polynomials we need to estimate, for a given calculation, a lower bound on the p and d. This is to determine parameters our SHE scheme needs to support to enable a given calculation to be performed correctly. In previous works this problem was not addressed. In this section we provide a methodology to produce tight bounds on the size of p, for any given computation.
To perform our analysis, we first note that as we pass through a general integer circuit each encrypted polynomial expression we are processing will be of the form
where t is the number of distinct ranges [−L i , . . . , L i ] for input/scalar values. p di, * is a polynomial of degree d i with infinity norm B Bal i,0 = 1. The c * are some constants and the value M is the maximal depth. Here we count scalar multiplication as consuming one level of depth. If we wish to determine the infinity norm of such a term we can simplify the discussion by just considering terms of the form
Indeed we define
In what follows, to ease discussion, the subscript indices are ordered such that We can now bound the infinity norm of any polynomial P obtained in evaluating the integer circuit by an expression of the form
where a [(d1,e1),...,(dt,et)] are constants depending on the precise polynomial P , and we think of this (for now) as a formal sum in the variables c [(d1,e1),...,(dt,et)] .
For an input or scalar value from the range [−L i , . . . , L i ] the infinity norm of the polynomial P 0 is bounded by
We can derive upper bounds on the infinity norm of the polynomials as we pass through the integer circuit using the following rules. Given upper bounds on the infinity norm of polynomials P and P in this form given by ,e1) we can derive upper bounds on the infinity norm of the sum and the product of these polynomials terms via the equations Is it clear that the degree of the sum of two polynomials is the maximum of the degrees, and the degree of the product is the sum of the degrees.
Bounding c [(d1,e1),...,(dt,et)]
To use these bounds we eventually obtain a formal expression for infinity norm of the output of the circuit consisting of a linear polynomial in the terms c [ (d1,e1) ,...,(dt,et)] . We thus are left with simply bounding c [(d1,e1),...,(dt,et)] . We perform this bounding at the end, rather than as we go, as these leads to much tighter bounds on the infinity norm of the output polynomial. We first present some basic facts on the case of a single pair of terms (d, e). Let d, e ≥ 0 be integers, and define a i for 0
We then define
Naively we can obtain upper and lower bounds on c d,e as follows:
The upper bound is obtained by evaluating (4) The parameter c d,e is also of interest in probability theory and bounds on its value have been previously analysed [1, 11] . The following upper bound follows from the main theorem in [11] (see also [1] for a relation between the parameter c m,n and the main parameter studied in [11] ).
The above upper bound is optimal in the following sense [11, Remark (a)].
π·d·(d+2) . Although it is unknown whether the above convergence is uniform as d varies as well.
Given this bound on terms c d,e we can now derive bounds on our terms c [ (d1,e1) ,...,(dt,et)] as follows. Recalling our ordering of the pairs in the subscript of d i · e i ≤ (d i+1 · e i+1 ) and in the case of equality, d i < d i+1 . We (recursively) use the following bound, where d k is the first value of d i in the subscript for which the associated e k value is non-zero,
where e i = e i except that e k = 0.
Applying The Bounds
We can now estimate the size of p and d needed to ensure correctness when evaluating our example balanced integer circuit that consists of M levels and A additions per level. The infinity norm bound on our polynomials becomes 
To ensure correctness, when we encrypt and manipulate these polynomials homomorphically, we need to ensure that our SHE scheme supports a plaintext with
The most stringent constraint is that on p, and we give examples in Section A.2 of the Supplementary Material. Of course given a specific circuit we could derive other values of d M and B M , the above are just examples in the case of our regular circuit with multiplicative depth M and A additions per level. See later for an application using the FFT where our more general analysis becomes applicable.
Homomorphic Image Processing via the Fourier Transform
A standard image processing pipeline is to take an image (consisting of n pixels), pass it into the frequency domain by applying the Fourier transform, apply an operation in the Fourier domain, and then map back to the image space by applying the inverse Fourier transform. The operation in the Fourier domain in its simplest form could be the Hadamard component wise multiplication of the data by a fixed matrix. For example this is used when applying Gabor filters, which feature prominently in applications that are motivated by biological vision.
In this section we examine the application of our fixed point analysis to the case of image processing in which the initial image and the Hadamard transformation data are both encrypted using a SHE scheme. It is well known that the Fourier transform is a linear operation, and hence only requires (in theory) an additively homomorphic encryption scheme to obtain an encrypted version. However, our requirement that the processing in the frequency domain is also unknown to the evaluator implies that our overall operation is non-linear. For means of comparison of parameters with prior work [2, 3] , which used Paillier encryption and only processed a single FFT operation, we also provide a comparison of parameters in that case.
The Mixed Fourier Transform Algorithm
The standard method to apply the (radix-2) Fourier transform 5 is to use the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) which is a recursive algorithm requiring O(log n) depth of scalar multiplications and a total of O(n·log n) scalar multiplications in total. As we have seen the need to perform a large depth of scalar multiplications will imply a large plaintext modulus for our SHE scheme. The naive method of performing the Fourier transform is to simply apply a matrix-vector product. This requires only depth one of scalar multiplications but on the other hand requires O(n 2 ) scalar multiplications. We will refer to this method as the Naive Fourier Transform (NFT).
There is an obvious balance to be struck here, which we present in Figure  1 . This is an algorithm, which we dub the Mixed Fourier Transform (MFT) algorithm. It executes standard recursive FFT algorithm down to a given depth log 2 (B) , and then at this lower level executes the naive Fourier transform method.
When we execute M F T (x, n, 1) we perform the full traditional Fast Fourier Transform method, while when we execute M F T (x, n, n) we perform the naive Fourier transform method. All values of B in between execute a hybrid approach. By varying B we can trade a reduced depth of scalar multiplications for an increased total number of multiplications. It is obvious that the depth of scalar x2, x4 , . . . , xn−2), m, B). x3, x5 , . . . , xn−1), m, B). 
Solving this yields
as the number of multiplications performed in a MFT circuit.
Comparison With Prior Work
In [2, 3] the authors present work on implementing a radix-2 FFT in the encrypted domain using the Paillier encryption algorithm. As a means of comparison of their work with ours we examine how their Paillier parameters would compare to our Ring-LWE parameters in their setting. The first key aspect is the precision of the input values, the roots of unity and the output precision. Both [2, 3] and ourselves use a fixed point encoding in which precision is never lost. But if one implemented FFT on a machine with b bits of floating point precision one would loose precision as the calculation proceeds. This means that to obtain the same output as running in the clear on a standard machine using floating point arithmetic, we can adapt the precision of the roots of unity.
In particular, we let b 1 denote the bits of precision in the input data (which is typically eight), b 2 denote the bits of precision in the roots of unity and b denote the bits of equivalent output bits of precision in an in-the-clear implementation. Then [2, 3] show that for a single iteration of the FFT algorithm on data of size 2 v , one can take
Using this they are able to implement the FFT in the encrypted domain using a Paillier modulus of bit size
where α = 1 for the naive Fourier transform, and α = v − 2 for the full FFT; they do not consider a mixed Fourier Transform.
As a means of comparison we look at the same situation using our polynomial encoding for use in the Ring-LWE system. The degrees of the associated polynomails to encode the input data and the roots of unity, in balanced base 3 encoding, are
Applying the analysis from Section 4 to a single Fourier Transform execution, we can obtain formulae for the infinity norm of the resulting polynomials via a computer algebra system in the form of a linear sum of terms the following form
where 0 ≤ e 2 ≤ depth(n, B). Note that e 1 = 1 as we are only executing a single FFT operation. Then using equations 7 and 8 and the fact that c d,1 = 1 we can give an upper bound this quantity
.
Hence, we can upper bound the linear sum and so lower bound the plaintext modulus p needed for the SHE scheme to ensure correctness. A similar method allows us to upper bound the degree of the resulting polynomials. This itself leads to a lower bound on the ring dimension deg(R) needed for the SHE scheme. We summarize the results in Table 1 for emulating b = 32 bits of floating point precision and b 1 = 8 bit inputs.
FFT B = 1 B = √ n NFT B = n log 2 p deg(R) log 2 p deg(R) log 2 p deg(R) n b2 d1 d2 ≥  ≥  ≥  ≥  ≥  ≥  16 29 5 18 54  190  37  118  25  46  64 27 5 17 74  248  49  146  29  44  256 25 5 16 93  298  61  170  33  42  1024 23 5 15 112  340  72  190  37  40   Table 2 . Parameters for the FFT-Hadamard-iFFT pipeline where sk is the secret key (a short element in R q ) and is a short "noise" element in R q . As homomorphic operations progress the value q of the ciphertext is reduced, until it can be reduced no more. At this point, operations cease to be possible. The reduction in q enables the noise value to be controlled, and each reduction in q is said to consume a homomorphic "level". Note, that the HELib library due to its choice of moduli for each level actually consumes multiple "internal levels" for each of these "external levels". In Table 3 we present our implementation results using the HELib. In each case we used the plaintext modulus size derived from the Table 2 , we note that in all cases HELib selects a ring dimension for security reasons which is much larger than we need for our application. This last fact means that by careful choice of the plaintext modulus one can process many such operations in parallel using standard SIMD tricks; with the amortization constant being (roughly) the actual degree of R divided by the lower bound from 2. We note that we cannot obtain results for the larger plaintext spaces as HELib has a restriction of 60 bits on the plaintext modulus. In future work we aim to remove this restriction by utilizing a different SHE library. All run times measure the time in seconds to evaluate the FFT-Hadamard-iFFT pipeline in the homomorphic domain, and they are obtained on a machine with six Intel Xeon E5 2.7GHz processors, and with 64 GB RAM. Table 7 . Size (in bits) of the smallest p and the degree bounds for balanced encoding with B = 7 and L = 2 19 .
